Coral Harbour Base, February 19, 2019 – Bahamas – The maritime borders of The Bahamas are challenged by illicit activities that often occur at the same time within different geographical locations around The Bahamas. To effectively respond to multiple threats including drug, human and weapons smuggling, as well as poaching and natural disasters, the Royal Bahamas Defence Force has been steadily unfolding a comprehensive program to decentralize its operations using a multi-layered security approach within a collaborative framework throughout our family of islands.
Short
term maritime security measures alone will not work in solving challenges that
confront The Bahamas in these changing times. Currently, most of the Defence
Force patrol operations originate out of New Providence in the north-central
Bahamas. The multi-pronged dentralization program in which the Defence Force is
engaged calls for the establishment of bases for a sustained presence at
strategic choke points throughout our islands.
The program therefore involves the acquisition of ships, dredging of harbours, construction of quaywalls and jetties, expansion and/or construction of bases, the acquisition of detection and tracking technologies, and the strengthening of security cooperation with local and regional partners over the next five years.
In
essence, decentralization’ is a long term, sustainable solution that
facilitates the implementation of short term measures by the Defence Force in
rolling back a diverse number of illicit activities. Additionally, this
approach allows the Defence Force to provide necessary assistance to civilian
authorities such as police, customs, immigration, the Department of
Correctional Services, the National Emergency Management Agemcy and others.
PAST
ACTIVITIES
Despite
changes in the manner in which illicit activities are carried out on the
maritime front, the Defence Force’s anti-migrant smuggling operations have
unilaterally and in association with local and regional partners have apprehended
almost 1,200 Haitian nationals last year. Also last year, approximately 200
Dominicans were apprehended by the Defence Force aboard 5 motherships resulting
in the award of jail time and approximately $8 million dollars in fines by the
courts.
The Defence
Force had also deployed a number of its Marines to work with the Royal Bahamas
Police Force in its crime reduction efforts on our streets throughout the year.
The joint effort, which is still underway, yielded a noted reduction in the
nation’s murder rate–the lowest in a decade. This collaboration also included
two major operations in the Family Islands, resulting in arrests of persons
wanted by Police or found in possession of weapons, drugs, and other
contraband.
In
addition to extensive disaster relief operations that were carried out at home
and abroad (including an overseas mission to the Commonwealth of Dominica)
during the period 2015 through 2017, Defence Force troops have provided
fulltime security support for the residents of Ragged Island since that island
was left devastated by Hurricane Irma in 2017.
CHANGING
TRENDS AND PATTERNS
Smuggling
of undocumented migrants is a major threat to The Bahamas. Needless to say,
times and technologies have changed, so too have trends and patterns that are
associated with the age-old problems of human, gun and drug smuggling, along
with increased potential for terrorist-related activities. Weather patterns
have also changed with an increase in frequency of tropical storms and
hurricanes in the region.
In the case of smuggling of undocumented migrants, there have been noticeable changes with the type of vessels being used and the maritime routes taken by smugglers to enter The Bahamas. In addition to using traditional sailing sloops, smugglers are now using conventional sailing yachts, as well as motorized boats that make it more difficult to detect them. To improve their chances of evading authorities, smugglers are also networking with locals in the islands.
The thing that has not changed over many years is the improvement of border controls at the source country (the Republic of Haiti), which itself is challenged by a vast coastline and limited national resources to secure it. Thus, smugglers are able to operate freely at home, while placing more security demands on neighboring countries or territories such as The Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
As the
Defence Force makes headway in shutting down main smuggling routes, human
smugglers naturally shift to new or alternative routes. With this balloon
effect in play, common smuggling routes or access points now include the
traditional northward passage, as well as additional maritime corridors in the
southern Bahamas.
These
access points exist from as far east as the Turks and Caicos Islands to as far
west as Cay Lobos (on the ocean’s edge south of Andros Island). This southern
gateway spans a distance of over 300 nautical miles (nm) making it possible for
smugglers to by-pass Defence Force and US law enforcement assets operating in
the south.
CLASSIC
EXAMPLES
A classic
example of how trends and patterns have changed over the years is seen in the
matter involving the vessel that recently sank in waters off central Abaco on
Saturday 2 February 2019. This tragic incident resulted in the loss of over 30
Haitian nationals. Their vessel struck a reef six miles off mainland Abaco and
sank. It was not one of the traditional wooden sloops normally used for
smuggling, but rather a modern 40-foot sailing yacht commonly used by hundreds
of visitors to The Bahamas making it difficult for authorities to distinguish
it as a human smuggling vessel. Additionally, the passage taken by this vessel
could have very well been an irregular one off the eastern coast of our islands
in the Atlantic Ocean.
Another
example of changing trends is the influx of undocumented migrants being
smuggled into the Turks and Caicos Islands. This British Overseas Territory at
the southeastern end of The Bahama Island chain is extremely challenged by
smugglers of Haitian nationals. With a tiny population of over 30,000 people,
landings of undocumented migrants on these islands have been occurring more
frequently with smugglers using traditional sloops, as well as motorized
vessels with outboard engines.
Also, in
January of this year, Cuban authorities intercepted a Haitian sloop with over
90 persons on board. This vessel was more than likely making its way westward
along the Cuban coast with the hope of avoiding detection by Operation Bahamas
Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) helicopters based in Inagua, US Coast Guard vessels
patrolling the Windward Passage area near Haiti, and Defence Force patrol craft
stationed in the south before heading northward anywhere along the extensive
maritime boundary line between The Bahamas and Cuba.
OPERATION
DECENTRALIZATION
Although the Defence Force conducts patrols on short rotations in the southern Bahamas as part of its short term strategy, the organization is simultaneously unfolding its decentralization program through a multi-layered security approach with a collaborative approach for a sustaines and more effective effort. (
Presently,
most Defence Force operations originate out of Coral Harbour Base in New
Providence. Located in the north-central Bahamas, this base is over 300 nm from
Inagua in the south and approximately 150 nm from the top of the Abaco chain in
the north. New Providence-centric operations are time-consuming, ineffective
and create much unnecessary wear and tear on ships and personnel for operations
in the southern or northern Bahamas. The Defence Force’s decentralization
program, therefore, requires the establishment of regional commands with fully
operational bases at strategic locations in these areas over the next five
years.
The
decentralization program is designed to sustain the Defence Force’s presence at
strategic locations throughout The Bahamas. The program will also reduce
maintenance requirements on Defence Force ships and machinery, as well as limit
undue stress on ships’ personnel when on 24/7 patrol assignments.
The nine
ships that were acquired and the three major harbours yhat were dredged under
the $232 million dollar Sandy Bottom Project during the period 2014 – 2017
constituted the first phase of the Defence Force’s decentralization program.
The second and third phases of the decentralization program consists of the
establishment of bases and the acquisition of detection and tracking
technologies for the effective and efficient policing of Bahamian borders.
These bases are needed to sustain the operations of ships and aircraft at
strategic locations such as Inagua and Ragged Islands in the south, while
detection technologies are instslled to enhance the efficiency of these
operations.
A VAST
MARITIME DOMAIN
Unlike land patrols that have clearly defined boundaries with limited options for escape by criminals, the open sea has no limits. The vastness of The Bahamas maritime domain is severely underestimated by many. Take for example, how small the area just south of New Providence looks on a map. Often plied by Haitian sloops, this north-central area of the Great Bahama Bank is bounded by the Exuma Chain to the east, the Tongue of the Ocean to the west, and Green Cay near the southern end of the Tongue of the Ocean. In reality, this area alone covers over 9,000 square nautical miles of water. Compared to the 21-by-7-mile-wide New Providence Island where more than 70 percent of the nation’s population resides, this very small portion of the Great Bahama Bank is about 100 larger in size.
The
average distance at which a low lying vessel, and in particular, a Haitian
sloop can be seen on a clear day is approximately 3 to 7 miles with the naked
eye during daylight hours. (Even regular marine radars are limited in detecting
wooden Haitian sloops from a distance). In a very general sense, it would take
several ships to maintain an effective watch over the 300 nm stretch of water
between the Turks and Caicos Islands and Cay Lobos. Patrol effectiveness are
all the more diminished during nighttime operations when smugglers travel most.
A recent
example of the difficulty in detecting and tracking a human smuggling vessel is
found when a patrol craft, a US Coast Guard Cutter, an OPBAT aircraft, and a
police aircraft were deployed over several days to find a Haitian sloop that
was initially sighted almost 200 nm southeast of New Provodence. In the end,
the sloop was spotted by an OPBAT aircraft and intercepted by a Defence Force
patrol craft on Sunday 16 February 2019 approximately 40 nm south of New
Providence on the Great Bahama Bank.
The
absence of adequate bases and patrol craft aided by appropriate detection and
tracking technologies paints the picture of looking for a needle in the
proverbial ‘haystack’ when searching for targets of interest. Without such
technologies, more ships and personnel will be needed to keep a coastal watch
on land and at sea with increased wear and tear on assets and personnel.
ACQUISITION
OF REQUISITE TECHNOLOGIES
No single
asset or detection equipment is going to solve today’s challenges. Each asset
or equipment has its strengths and limitations; yet, their contributions are
complementary to the success of effective border security. For example, the
suspect vessel that a radar might fail to detect, might be located by a drone
or an aircraft. The use of detection and tracking equipment is not a cure-all’;
however, when used in a multi-layered approach, such technologies would enhance
the chances of detecting and tracking illicit activities within The Bahamas’
maritime domain.
An
effective decentralization program should therefore incorporate a multi-layered
security approach consisting of ships, aircraft, radars, drones, Automated
Identification Systems (AIS), Forward Looking Infra-Red Cameras, CCTVs, space
satellites, and other detection equipment to enhance operational effectiveness.
Already,
a coastal radar has been installed in Inagua inclusive of AIS equipment. It is
the first in a series of coastal radars to be installed along our chain of
islands with the financial support of the United States government. The US
government has also funded a multi-million dollar communications equipment
package that is being installed to improve Defence Force air, land and sea
communications. Additionally, proposals have been received by the Ministry of
Finance for the implementation of a multi-agency drone program that will
consist of long and short-range drones to be managed by the Ministry of
National Security.
INTERAGENCY
AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Furthermore,
no single agency can roll back the tide of illicit activities. Interagency
cooperation has been the mantra of the Minister of National Security, the
Honourable Marvin Dames, ever since taking office in 2017. In further
strengthening its resolve to prevent, monitor, detect, deter and/or apprehend
those who violate our maritime laws, the RBDF continues to engage in
collaborative efforts with its regional partners–the US, the Turks and Caicos
Islands, the Republic of Cuba, and Jamaica–in the areas of information sharing
and security cooperation with favourable results. The Defence Force also looks
forward to engaging in security cooperation dialogue with its counterparts in
the Republic of Haiti and the Dominican Republic through the office of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
THE WAY
AHEAD
Undoubtedly,
the way ahead requires significant investment, which is being addressed. In
view of multiple maritime challenges confronting The Bahamas, the Defence Force
is shifting from a reactionary approach towards the phased implementation of
its decentralization program for the effective policing of borders of The
Bahamas.
In the
interim, the dedicated, hard-working men and women of the Defence Force will
continue to adjust and adapt their mode of operating to overcome human
smuggling and other illegal activities in collaboration with local and regiomal
partners while the goal of decentralization is being realized.
(For further
information please contact the RBDF Public Relations Department or visit our
website: www.rbdf.gov.bs, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and view our Youtube channel)